Joe Berry
Kosmopolitische NBA-Koryphäe
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Es ist mal wieder so weit, in einem race to the bottom, von der Spannung vergleichbar mit dem Kampf um die Playoffplätze, kämpfen Lotteryteams um ihre Ausgangsposition für die NBA draft lottery. Nur wird hier derjenige belohnt, der mehr Niederlagen anhäuft.
Als Pistons-Fan ist es mal wieder frustrierend zu sehen, wie die Pistons nach einem 4-19 Start in die Saison einem sicher geglaubten Top 3 Pick, sich so langsam Pick 8 oder 9 annähern.(bzw. sind die Chancen dann so gering, das man zu 99,x% Pick 8 oder 9 bekommen wird)
In diesem System wird man für Niederlagen bestraft, wenn man nicht am Tanking-Spiel teilnehmen will, schlechte Leistungen werden belohnt.
Auch wenn das Lotterysystem jetzt schon so länger Bestand hat, auf Dauer kann das nicht so weiter gehen.
ESPN & Truehoop haben gerade eine schöne Serie gestartet, Lets end tanking
Der Artikel beschreibt das Problem sehr gut, lesenswert.
http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/39318/tanking-is-the-tip-of-the-iceberg
Das Thunder Rebuilding-Modell funktioniert auch nicht für jeden.
http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/39546/the-oklahoma-city-unicorns
Jeff Van Gundys Lösungsvorschlag:
Es wird endlich Zeit, diese Draft Lottery zu reformieren, gutes Management zu belohnen, und schlechtes zu bestrafen, nicht umgekehrt.
Warum also nicht gleiche Chancen für alle, dann fällt jeder Anreiz zum Tanken weg. Die NBA ist eine Star getriebene Liga, ohne diese Franchiseplayer wird man kaum um eine Championchip konkurrieren, warum werden also Teams belohnt die vorsätzlich nicht alles tun, um zu gewinnen, das stinkt mir einfach.
Als Pistons-Fan ist es mal wieder frustrierend zu sehen, wie die Pistons nach einem 4-19 Start in die Saison einem sicher geglaubten Top 3 Pick, sich so langsam Pick 8 oder 9 annähern.(bzw. sind die Chancen dann so gering, das man zu 99,x% Pick 8 oder 9 bekommen wird)
In diesem System wird man für Niederlagen bestraft, wenn man nicht am Tanking-Spiel teilnehmen will, schlechte Leistungen werden belohnt.
Auch wenn das Lotterysystem jetzt schon so länger Bestand hat, auf Dauer kann das nicht so weiter gehen.
ESPN & Truehoop haben gerade eine schöne Serie gestartet, Lets end tanking
Der Artikel beschreibt das Problem sehr gut, lesenswert.
http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/39318/tanking-is-the-tip-of-the-iceberg
Acting like a bad team
Here's where tanking gets really crazy: When teams with really smart front offices are forced to mimic teams with really bad front offices.
"The process of rebuilding is extremely rough on everyone," says Raptors GM Bryan Colangelo, "and unfortunately made worse by the reality that the whole system is counterintuitive. Strangely, losing may help you eventually win. But players, coaches and management are all in this place trained as competitors. How in the world do you tell a player or coach to go out there and lay down? The answer is you don’t. But I continually stress that even in defeat we must win in other ways with the intent of moving the dial forward."
In other words, build with talent, build with coaching, build with culture and build with the long-term benefits of losing.
Or take this year's worst team, the Bobcats, now run by Cho, who is well-regarded. What's plaguing the Bobcats is a history of mistakes, but also the reality that the front office -- Michael Jordan, Rod Higgins, Cho and company -- is not doing all it can to win right now. If there are cheap free agents they could add to make this team better, they have not added them. If there are better coaches available, now would not be the time to hire them.
Cho says he made something like that a condition of his joining the team. "They called me the day after I got let go by Portland," he recalls of the Bobcats. Cho had three years left on his Portland contract, and had that finest of luxuries -- he simply didn't have to work. "I had thought about taking some time off, or teaching at a high school," he told me on a recent episode of TrueHoop TV. "I thought about maybe coaching high school tennis, which I've wanted to do for a long time."
But he flew to Charlotte for a conversation that came down to a key moment, when Cho asked if the Bobcats really wanted to win. As in, did they want to win so badly that they'd be willing to follow in the footsteps of Cho's former employer, the Thunder, who won 20 games one season, and then 23 the next, in the process of amassing the core of their current team?
In other words, Cho was asking, were they willing to lose? "Are you willing," Cho remembers asking, "to take a step back to take two steps forward?"
Cho says the room answered, unanimously, "yes." A few months later, that team is 7-40.
Cho explains how the Thunder did it. When they had cap room, they didn't use it. Massive losing streaks helped too. The team's point guard of the future (Russell Westbrook) learned on the job while leading the league in turnovers.
There is no suggestion that any of the players or coaches didn't try their hardest. But the fact is the front office trotted out a young, cheap and, frankly, bad team for a good long time. Intentionally. During those same years they could have been, with a different strategy, far more competitive. But if they had done that, they'd never be leading the Western Conference right now, because they wouldn't have gotten the good players that came with the good picks that came from losing.
HoopIdea: Evidence-based incentives
I asked the NBA's Litvin what he makes of economists who insist the league would have more teams making better decisions if the best incentives were not handed to the bad teams.
His reply: Sports are not bound by the usual logic of economics.
"What you continue to characterize as giving prizes for coming in last, I continue to characterize as help for the teams that are the weakest," he explains. "If an economist has a hard time with that, it may be because this is a business that thrives on competitive balance and the goal is not to compete each other out of existence. That’s not how sports leagues operate. They operate on the basis of the best possible competition on the floor or the field."
Meanwhile, there is strong evidence some teams are chronically making bad decisions, the role model franchise is one that barely competed for years and the NBA's own economist pointed out during the lockout that the league has perhaps the worst competitive balance in sports (the opposite of what the league is claiming its system creates).
And the big prize driving all that is something handed out by the NBA.
In other words, what's happening is exactly what economists say would happen if you had the incentives all messed up. Could this really be the smartest way to do things?
Das Thunder Rebuilding-Modell funktioniert auch nicht für jeden.
http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/39546/the-oklahoma-city-unicorns
All hail the Thunder model!
It's hard to sell an ownership group and fans thirsty for a winner on that first part -- the part about enduring multiple abysmal seasons. But if you can guarantee that the second part -- the fun, up-and-coming team full of young, athletic and talented players -- people will happily buy in to losing.
The idea that has spread is to do what the Thunder did. Reboot. Strategically become bad to have the chance to become really, really good. The Bobcats are an example of just such a team -- it hired someone from the Thunder front office, Cho, and is selling its fan base on “the Thunder model.”
It’s easy. All you have to do is hit home runs on three top-five lottery picks (Durant, Westbrook, Harden), get an absolute steal in the middle of the first round (Ibaka) and hope all four players exceed the expectations of the basketball world, get along well and become active, well-loved members in their community. And it only takes six years.
Livin’ on a prayer
Here’s my list of top five picks that have become surefire franchise players (and the spot at which each was taken) in the last 10 years:
Yao Ming (2002, No. 1), LeBron James (2003, No. 1), Dwyane Wade (2003, No. 5), Dwight Howard (2004, No. 1), Deron Williams (2005, No. 3), Chris Paul (2005, No. 4), LaMarcus Aldridge (2006, No. 2), Kevin Durant (2007, No. 2), Derrick Rose (2008, No. 1), Russell Westbrook (2008, No. 4), Kevin Love (2008, No. 5), Blake Griffin (2009, No. 1) and Kyrie Irving (2011, No. 1).
That's 13 players in 10 drafts. If your team drafted in the top five, you had a one-in-four chance of snagging one of the future All-NBA candidates on the list above. That means most top-five draft choices cannot turn around their teams. Drafting in the top five, a team is more likely to end up with Raymond Felton, or if you’re lucky, Mike Conley, than Chris Paul. Still, teams are willing to make that long-shot bid, because any chance at all to get the next Dwight Howard is a chance worth tanking … err, taking.
What I’m suggesting is that the current lottery system does not help struggling teams nearly as much as one might think. It’s a collection of life preservers thrown a struggling group of franchises, but only one in four actually float. Thrashing about in the deep blue sea of futility to get that kind of odds of finding a great player hardly seems worth it.
Meanwhile, losing enough games to end up in the high lottery takes a serious toll on franchises and fan bases -- where the hope of finding a franchise savior in the lottery is sometimes the only thing that makes a team worth caring about. But relying on that kind of deus ex machina solution also breeds bad organizational habits and cultures of losing. Not every group of 21-year-old players, or any group of players, really, should be expected to go from starting a season 3-29 to finishing 52-30 the next.
The Thunder and Chicago Bulls are examples of teams that grabbed superb talents at the top of the draft but also made dozens of smart decisions up and down the organization -- like hiring Tom Thibodeau in Chicago and finding a creative, cap-friendly way to extend Nick Collison in Oklahoma City.
Getting lucky for three straight years in the draft is only a part of the Thunder story. The reality is teams that draft in the lottery for six straight years are more likely to resemble the Kings than become the Thunder. To a perpetually bad franchise pursuing "the Thunder model," my advice is the same as it would be for someone hunting a unicorn: good luck, and don't be upset if all you find are horses.
Jeff Van Gundys Lösungsvorschlag:
http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/39583/fix-tanking-jeff-van-gundyI would either have an inverse lottery, like the best record gets the most chances -- so trying becomes of paramount importance.
Or at the very least, everybody has an equal chance, so there is absolutely no benefit to trying to be bad.
Now, before you get all excited about how Van Gundy's solution would create a few super teams and leave everybody else in the cold, let me remind you:
In the real world, whether at school or work, the people who do the best get the most rewards, and that seems to generally work out OK.
Economists insist this would make not just a few teams but the whole league stronger.
Bad teams would still get good draft picks, not just all the good draft picks.
It would put a real premium on great long-term team management, which could be the best news ever for fans of bad teams.
Es wird endlich Zeit, diese Draft Lottery zu reformieren, gutes Management zu belohnen, und schlechtes zu bestrafen, nicht umgekehrt.
Warum also nicht gleiche Chancen für alle, dann fällt jeder Anreiz zum Tanken weg. Die NBA ist eine Star getriebene Liga, ohne diese Franchiseplayer wird man kaum um eine Championchip konkurrieren, warum werden also Teams belohnt die vorsätzlich nicht alles tun, um zu gewinnen, das stinkt mir einfach.
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