Bayern's major rivals during this period were Borussia Dortmund, who had enjoyed a two-year spell of Bundesliga dominance under Jürgen Klopp. They were a very different side. Whereas Bayern's fondness for superstars and squabbles led to them to being nicknamed 'FC Hollywood' in the 1990s, Dortmund were cast as an old-school working-class club reliant on their fighting spirit and a raucous atmosphere.
While Bayern could sign ready-made superstars, including cherry-picking Dortmund's best players, Klopp's side was populated by modest homegrown talents like Marcel Schmelzer and Mario Götze, alongside clever signings from lesser leagues like Shinji Kagawa and Robert Lewandowski. They were greater than the sum of their parts, thanks to Klopp's tactical intelligence and ability to galvanise supporters and players alike.
The most fundamental part of Klopp's philosophy was his so- called 'gegenpressing' - more on that later - but Dortmund's counter-attacking was also sensational, and their transformation from finishing fifth in 2009/10 to winning the title the following season was about added directness: Vertikalspiel, as the German press described it. 'We've started putting a much, much greater focus on vertical passes,' Klopp acknowledged midway through his first title-winning campaign.
The difference between Bayern and Dortmund was typified by the nature of the wide players. Ribéry and Robben were genuine world-beaters, whereas Dortmund's Kevin Großkreutz and Jakub Błaszczykowski were more workmanlike, known more for their energy than their technical quality. In Klopp's system they acted as wide midfielders rather than wingers, and tucked inside close to the central players.
Although both were capable of dribbling, they were more focused on off-the-ball sprints into spaces vacated by the opposition full-backs, creating vertical passing options and making good decisions on the run. 'We're tactically very disciplined, trying to get the ball forward from a structured base,' explained centre- back Mats Hummels. 'But that's just what most teams are trying to do. What we've got is genuine passion. We're properly up for it.'
Concepts like these-motivation, passion, desire - are sometimes considered an alternative to a tactical approach. But Klopp ensured such concepts enhanced his tactical approach, and his animated presence on the touchline came to symbolise Dortmund, who did everything with tremendous energy and commitment. 'It's about making the crowd happy, about producing games with a recognisable style,' Klopp declared on his unveiling at Dortmund. He stuck to his word. Journalists spoke about heavy metal football, about full-throttle football, finding any metaphor that involved speed, noise and organised chaos.
Whereas Bayern were openly modelling themselves on the Barcelona model, Klopp positioned himself as the alternative. 'Barcelona's team of the last four years, with their serenity... sorry, that's not enough for me,' he laughed. 'If Barcelona's team of the last four years had been the first one that I saw play when I was four, I would have played tennis instead. I like fighting football, not serenity football; rainy day, heavy pitch, everybody has a dirty face, and then they go home and can't play football for the next four weeks. That's what Borussia are all about.' Klopp would later speak admiringly about Barcelona's pressing game, but in possession he wanted something different. It was Dortmund rather than Bayern who represented modern German football, and their archetypal counter-attacking performance came with a legendary 5-2 win over Bayern in the German cup final of 2012.
The cup final was a scrappy affair, characterised by defensive mistakes. Bayern goalkeeper Manuel Neuer had a particularly poor game, and both sides scored penalties after clumsy, needless fouls. But the cup final victory was pure Dortmund, with Lewandowski leading the line, Kagawa drifting laterally into pockets of space to prompt counter-attacks, and Großkreutz and Błaszczykowski roaring forward out wide.
Later, Klopp would find himself forced into tactical tweaks to surprise Bayern, and the arrival of the speedy goalscoring winger Marco Reus and development of Mario Götze would offer more star quality. But, like every great heavy metal act, Dortmund's earliest material was their best.
Dortmund's cup final victory perfectly demonstrated the concept of the transition, a term that had come into popular usage a few years beforehand but was a particularly fundamental part of German football ideology. The offensive transition is the moment when a side goes from not having possession to having possession, and the defensive transition is the reverse. Dortmund were particularly adept at the former.
Großkreutz and Błaszczykowski played important roles at these offensive transitions. Bayern dominated possession, and so for the majority of the game Dortmund's wide midfielders were deep inside their own third, helping their full-backs by doubling up against Ribéry and Robben. And then, when Bayern's passing moves broke down and Dortmund won possession, they would suddenly break. Both wide players were excellent at sensing when a transition was imminent, and would start their attacking movements before Bayern's full-backs had sensed the danger, sprinting into gaps and encouraging vertical passes. Kagawa, meanwhile, perfected the number 10 role, making arced runs into the channels...